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Abstract
The 1918 “Spanish influenza” was the worst influenza pandemic in recorded history.
This paper traces advancements made in medicine and public health, especially those made
during the latter half of the nineteenth century through the early twentieth century, leading up to
the 1918 pandemic, by examining primary source materials and scholarly secondary sources.
Unfortunately, the viral cause of influenza would not begin to be understood until the early
1930s. In 1918, the lack of scientific understanding of viruses led to many theories on the nature
of influenza, including how to best treat it, and, ultimately, to a feeling of failure among many in
the medical community. Fragmentation between state and federal public health organizations at
the beginning of the pandemic resulted in a lack of preparation and preventative measures, such
as social distancing, in many east coast cities. The impacts of the 1918 influenza in cities like
Boston during September 1918, were eye-opening for public health and government officials in
Seattle. Seattle escaped the fate of many east coast cities through preparation, unified messaging
between national and local public health and government officials, and the implementation of
proactive preventative measures. The lessons learned from Seattle’s handling of the 1918 flu can
be applied today in our efforts to combat diseases like COVID-19 and future strains of novel
viruses.

1

Introduction
The 1918 “Spanish influenza” pandemic was the deadliest infectious disease outbreak in
history. The virus infected approximately one-third of the world’s population and was
responsible for the deaths of between fifty and one-hundred million people worldwide.1
Traveling with an ease and speed made possible through the twin threat of globalization and war,
the disease wreaked havoc across the globe. Though World War I (WWI) was drawing to a
close, the movement of troops greatly contributed to the spread of the influenza virus as America
joined in the fighting. A series of three influenza infections, or “waves,” traveled across the
globe between 1918 and 1919. The first wave is generally believed to have appeared in the
United States in March of 1918. The second wave arrived in the fall and ran its course from
September through November of 1918 and the third wave arrived in January of 1919. The first of
these waves remained mild enough to escape the notice of most Americans, as death rates were
only slightly elevated.2 Reports from Europe in the summer of 1918, between the first and
second waves in the United States, indicated a change in the virus’ pathogenicity, and described
it as a severe “plague.”3 Unfortunately, many health officials in the U.S. failed to grasp the
serious threat posed by this virulent strain of influenza. As a result, when the flu reappeared in
the U.S. for the second wave in the fall of 1918, officials in many east coast cities were
seemingly taken by surprise at the high levels of morbidity and mortality experienced as its
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result. By the time the third wave hit, there was no longer any doubt as to the deadly
consequences of this disease.
A look at history leaves one to ponder how it was that leaders in public health and the
government were caught so off guard by the arrival and severity of the 1918 flu. The “Russian
influenza,” or the flu of 1889, had struck the United States only thirty years prior. The
emergence of this strain of influenza led public health officials to call for increased funding for
research and education and provided many lessons on the unpredictable nature of influenza.4
That many public health and government officials, not to mention the general public, seemed to
have collectively forgotten the lessons learned from the “Russian flu” may point to a more
widespread socio-cultural phenomenon surrounding collective trauma. This cultural forgetting
again seems to have occurred after the 1918 flu. After experiencing an unprecedented three
waves of influenza within a year’s time, the collective cultural desire to get back to “normal”
was prioritized, especially by those in the media and the government, over the need for a
collective healing.5 This desire to forget and move on from a traumatic experience is, in many
ways, a natural response. But, as a result, very little was written about the 1918 flu in the years
following it, and, like the “Russian flu,” it too would be left in the past until the emergence of a
new and deadly virus would lead us back in history, searching for answers.
It is a very human trait to relate our current situation to past experiences; indeed, this is
what has led to my research on the 1918 flu. It is not a coincidence that we are in the midst of the
COVID-19 pandemic while I write this paper. I am continually struck by the similarities
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between the 1918 flu and COVID-19. Today, globalization continues to play an important role in
the transmission of disease. Unlike in 1918, when the journey from the United States to Europe
entailed a week’s travel across the ocean, the speed at which humans can go from one side of the
globe to the other has rapidly increased. Travel and trade continue to aid in the spread of disease,
but today our interconnectedness is exponentially greater than it was one-hundred years ago. In
addition to globalization, climate change has also produced favorable environments for the
transmission of disease and an increasing proximity between humans and the animals that serve
as either natural reservoirs or intermediary hosts for novel viral strains. These circumstances
have increased the likelihood of novel viruses being introduced and spread among human
populations and have increased the need for investments in medicine and public health research,
education, and outreach. Because the 1918 influenza virus hit the east coast first, Seattle had time
to prepare for the oncoming flu. The actions of Seattle public health officials and government
leaders resulted in lower morbidity and mortality rates for the citizens of Seattle. In studying the
1918 flu in Seattle we can learn valuable lessons on the importance of public health preparedness
and the necessity of cooperation and unified messaging among public health and government
leaders.

Methodology
For this paper, I chose to focus my research on two historical Seattle newspapers: The
Seattle Star and Seattle Post-Intelligencer. I first consulted the Library of Congress’
“Chronicling America” newspaper database. I searched for Seattle newspaper articles that
captured mentions of the “flu” and “influenza” and were printed between May 1918 and
February 1919. I began my research with the Seattle Star newspaper based on the database’s
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preferential returns, which favored articles from this newspaper over articles from other
newspapers. I utilized the University of Washington’s historical newspaper database to access
Seattle Post-Intelligencer articles. Again, I searched for articles that mentioned the “flu,” with a
beginning date of May 1918 and an ending date of January of 1919. I chose the Seattle PostIntelligencer specifically based on its ease of access on the database. This search is limited, as
there are a number of other local Seattle newspapers from 1918-1919 that would be of interest
for continued research. I further limited the historical articles I chose to cite in my research to
articles ranging from June 1918 to October 1918 for the express purpose of highlighting Seattle
city officials’ efforts in preparation, public health and government messaging, and preventative
measures leading up to the arrival of the second wave of influenza in Seattle. I also relied on
death rate statistics from the Seattle-King County Department of Health and Department of
Annual Reports for the years 1918-1919. In addition to historical newspaper articles, I used
contemporary articles from the New York Times to draw parallels between the 1918 pandemic
and the COVID-19 pandemic.
The desire to forget traumatic experiences, such as the 1918 influenza, is evident in the
lack of writing that can be found directly following the pandemic of 1918-1919. One of the
earliest works I found that addresses the 1918 pandemic is the 1939 novella, Pale Horse, Pale
Rider, by Katherine Anne Porter. This novella offers a fictionalized, yet semi-autobiographical
account of the 1918 influenza. Porter’s work offers a lens into the traumatic impacts of illness
and loss resulting from the “Spanish influenza.” The story recounts Porter’s near-death
experience as the result of contracting influenza, and the loss of a loved one from the same
illness. Porter’s characters make the experiences of the 1918 flu almost tangible for the reader.
This work left me with a greater understanding of how the trauma experienced during the 1918
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pandemic was a trauma which many people desired to forget. Though I did not cite this book in
my paper, the underlying lessons found in its pages did factor into my research. 6
In the podcast, Going Viral, Mark Honigsbaum and Hannah Mawdsley present multiple
theories on the origin of the 1918 influenza. My research relies on information presented in two
of the episodes from this series: “Some New Kind of Plague” and “The Blue Death.” John Barry,
who introduced the American origin theory, is interviewed by Honigsbaum and Mawdsley in
“Some New Kind of Plague” and discusses his research methods for tracing the origin of the
1918 influenza to Haskell County, Kansas. This episode also presents the Chinese origin theory
and a theory that the virus originated with the movement of American horses to the Western
Front at the beginning of WWI. The French origin theory is presented in “The Blue Death” by its
leading proponent, and world-renowned virologist, John Oxford.

Literature Review
There was little written about the 1918 influenza until the beginning of the twenty-first
century. Renewed interest in the subject occurred after scientists began work in the 1990s on
sequencing RNA fragments from tissue samples that had been collected from 1918. One of the
first books written after this research is Alfred Crosby’s America’s Forgotten Pandemic: The
Influenza of 1918 (2003). Crosby traces the arrival of America’s second wave of influenza in
1918 to Camp Devens, Massachusetts. He argues that the virus’ emergence as a worldwide
pandemic at the end of WWI was met with a lack of organization and preparation in the United
States, which he attributes to the financial and political strains caused by America’s involvement
in the war, as well as a lack of medical and scientific knowledge related to viruses. Crosby’s
6
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evidence relies on a number of government reports that show a lack of reporting on the flu. He
also relies on medical journals to illustrate the limited scientific understanding of the disease
during the 1918-1919 influenza outbreak. Crosby’s argument that there was little reporting on
the 1918 influenza is contested through the works of other secondary source authors such as John
Barry, Sandra Opdycke, and Tom Dicke. While it is true that after the pandemic receded there
was little written about the 1918 influenza and reporting may have been limited in certain
government agencies as the result of political pressure to deemphasize the impacts of the virus, it
was reported on extensively in newspaper articles at the time.
In his book, The Great Influenza: The Story of the Deadliest Pandemic in History (2005),
John Barry provides a well-researched reconstruction of the 1918 influenza, which includes
tracing the first recorded cases of the virus to Haskell County, Kansas. From there, Barry follows
the virus’ movement via American troops to the Western Front as the United States joined the
Allies in WWI. From there, Barry follows the virus’ mutation in Europe to a new, more deadly
strain and its reintroduction into the United States, which marked the beginning of the “second
wave.” Barry argues that high viral morbidity and mortality rates during the 1918 pandemic were
due to WWI conditions in which soldiers were placed in crowded and stressful environments and
in which the transportation of soldiers across the globe led to an increase in the spread of the
disease. Barry’s work also presents information on medical and scientific advancements leading
up to the 1918 influenza pandemic and the ways in which these advancements were applied to
public health mobilization efforts.
The quest to better understand the flu of 1918 continues to shape scientific research
today. In the 2006 article, “1918 Influenza: The Mother of All Pandemics,” Jeffery Taubenberger
and David Morens discuss some of the scientific advances that have helped us answer a number
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of questions about the 1918 flu. It was not until the 1930s that scientists were able to isolate the
first H1N1 viruses from pigs. Then in 1995, genetic RNA fragments from the 1918 influenza
were discovered in archived tissue samples from soldiers who had died during WWI. This led to
scientists successfully completing the genetic sequencing of the virus. These genetic sequences
show that the virus was derived from an avian-like influenza that infected both humans and pigs
during 1918. They also show that all subsequent influenza pandemics are descendants of the
“Spanish flu.” Further studies are necessary to understand the high morbidity and mortality rates
of the “Spanish influenza” compared to other flu viruses and to understand the patterns of
infection that occurred in 1918-1919 over a relatively short period of time.
Sandra Opdycke’s 2014 book, The Flu Epidemic of 1918: America’s Experience in the
Global Health Crisis, presents many of the same findings as John Barry’s The Great Influenza,
including his research on the 1918 influenza’s origins in Haskell County, Kansas. Opdycke also
discusses important medical advances in epidemiology and bacteriology prior to the 1918
pandemic and their public health applications during the 1918-1919 influenza outbreak.
Additionally, Opdycke includes an analysis of how race and gender shaped the experiences of
different groups during the 1918 influenza.
While Porter’s novella shaped my understanding of cultural responses to traumatic
events, Tom Dicke’s 2015 article, titled “Waiting for the Flu: Cognitive Inertia and the Spanish
Influenza Pandemic of 1918-19,” helped in my understanding of the cultural responses leading
up to the second wave of the 1918 pandemic. Dicke includes information from numerous
newspaper articles, specifically June 1918 through September 1918, to demonstrate that there
was an awareness of, and factual reporting on, the “Spanish flu” during this time. However, he
argues that the contextual framework necessary for understanding the increased threat posed by
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the novel influenza was lacking. This article provides information that helps us understand how
new information about emerging health threats is processed and understood by people at the
outset of pandemics from a socio-psychological perspective.
In Health Divided: Public Health and Individual Medicine in the Making of the Modern
American State (2017), Daniel Sledge provides a wealth of information on the formation and
structuring of the United States public health system. Sledge chronicles the formation of public
health organizations in the United States as well as the jurisdictional divisions between federal
public health and local public health agencies. Divisions between individual medicine and public
health are also discussed by Sledge, and are important for analyzing our current health crisis.
Sledge illustrates how fractured organizational structures in the United States public health
system present challenges during times of crisis, especially in the context of infectious disease
outbreaks.

Public Health and Medicine Leading up to 1918
Globalization has played a role in the spread of disease in America since the arrival of the
first colonists. Health care in early America was a local matter; state and local government
officials would hire physicians to oversee the health concerns of their residents.7 As populations
grew, so too did the need for health care and public health. Trade and commerce supported
population growth and were important drivers of the economy, but ships coming in and out of
U.S. ports brought more than trading goods; they also brought disease.
The Marine Hospital Service (MHS) was created by Congress in 1798 to provide sailors
with hospitals and compulsory insurance and was operated under the supervision of the Treasury
7
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Department. The healthcare provided by the Service was funded through the taxing of sailors.8
The MHS was the first public health service in the United States, but at the time its services were
quite limited. The demand for a more comprehensive public health service would spark debates
about how public health services would be provided, who would provide them, and how they
would be paid for. This debate about health care fit squarely in with debates about the role of the
government and how much power the federal government should have.
The importance of states’ sovereignty, local decision-making, and individual rights in
terms of health care were weighed against the need for the collective oversight and organization
of the federal government in limiting the spread of disease. In many ways, these debates have
been with us as a country since the very founding of the United States and continue to be with us
today. In 1824, Supreme Court Chief Justice John Marshall wrote his opinion that the powers
inherent in “health laws of every description” should “not [be] surrendered to the general
government.”9 This was a strong endorsement of states’ rights to oversee all health care matters,
including public health.
Public health was often overseen by local city and county boards of health. However, the
federal government had a strong incentive for providing public health oversight, as diseases do
not respect state borders. In an effort to implement more efficient oversight and organization to
the MHS, legislation was passed to create the position of supervising surgeon general in 1870.
Former Union Army medical officer John Maynard Woodworth reorganized the Service in the
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early 1870s along military lines, promoting officers of rank to physician positions. This practice
was eventually enacted into law through statute.10
In 1878, as the Caribbean exploded with yellow fever, the MHS was strategically
positioned in major ports, and Congress passed legislation which granted it the power to oversee
local quarantines. The MHS, however, had a difficult time controlling the spread of the disease
when the lower Mississippi Valley suffered a major outbreak of yellow fever that killed upwards
of 20,000 people. This outbreak motivated politicians in the south, who had been hesitant up
until that point, to support a federal response. With their support, the National Board of Health
was created in 1879 “to advise state and local boards of health, to obtain and publish pertinent
health information, to inquire into public health questions, and to plan for a permanent national
health organization.”11 However, as there were no further yellow fever outbreaks over the next
four years, Southern politicians grew wary of federal control; Congress halted its funding, and
the MHS returned to its limited role in overseeing quarantines in ports.12 The MHS’s role was
expanded in the 1890s to include the medical inspection of all immigrants for the stated purpose
of stopping the spread of cholera, yellow fever, smallpox and plague. Quarantine remained a
local and state prerogative through the early twentieth century, with New York being the last
state to hand quarantine responsibilities over to the federal government in 1921.13
In 1889, a new strain of influenza arrived in the United States, first in Hawaii and then in
California. Earlier reports of the “Russian flu” and its circulation in Europe were received prior
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to its arrival in the U.S. On December 19, 1889, the New York Times reported an outbreak in
Charles Street Jail in Boston; however, the article was quick to point out that this flu was not
likely to be serious and that it was “very slightly, if at all, contagious.”14 While American
authorities downplayed the risk of the virus, papers in Europe were reporting an increasingly dire
situation. A quotation from a Paris newspaper read “[t]he influenza is spreading and is very fatal.
The large number of deaths is exciting grave apprehensions.”15 By January 1, 1890, health
officials in New York issued “An Official Warning” asking that anyone exhibiting cold or
influenza symptoms seek medical treatment immediately.16 The dangers presented by this
disease led many in the MHS to petition Congress to approve funding for research. Congress
agreed, and in 1902 passed legislation. The MHS became the Public Health and Marine Hospital
Service and received funding for a Hygienic Laboratory, which today is located in Maryland and
has become the National Institutes of Health.17
The lack of authority and limited jurisdiction of the Public Health and Marine Hospital
inhibited its ability to confront many pressing public health concerns. For instance, in the 1890’s,
Rocky Mountain spotted fever had been identified but remained a poorly understood and deadly
disease. When the Public Health and Marine Hospital Service received a request from the
secretary of North Carolina’s State Board of Health to send “an officer to cooperate and assist his
board in efforts to eradicate the disease from the State,” they found that though they would have
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liked to send someone, they were unable to as there was no legal mechanism that allowed an
officer to be paid to work in cooperation with state and local officials.18 Clearly this lack of
cooperation between local and federal health officials presented a problem.
In order for public health measures to be effective, a scientific understanding of the
disease in question is necessary. A scientist by the name of Jacob Henle was the first to
formulate an understanding of modern germ theory. He wrote about this theory in an 1840 article
titled “On Miasma and Contagia” in which he provided evidence for the germ theory.19 This
theory stated that “minute living organisms invaded the body, multiplied, and caused disease,
and that a specific germ caused a specific disease.”20 At the time, there were three other theories:
the miasma theory which postulated that diseases came from unclean or putrid air, atmospheric
disturbances or climate related phenomenon; the theory of filth which argued that disease was
caused by “swamp gas,” a term used to describe the stench emanating from human waste; and
the chemical theory which argued that chemicals, or “zymes,” could cause disease by triggering
chemical reactions which would result in fermentation, or infection.21 Interestingly, as Barry
writes, “chemicals, radiation, and environmental factors can cause disease, although usually only
through long-term or massive exposure” and this “sophisticated version of the zymote theory
essentially describes what is today called a virus.”22
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The 1840s and 1850s showed particular promise for the advancement of public health.
During this time, John Snow used math and epidemiology to trace and locate the origins of a
deadly outbreak of cholera in London. With careful notes and skillful detective work, he
narrowed the source of the outbreak to a well, the contaminated water of which was causing the
disease.23 Though germ theory had yet to be proven, and the treatment and cure for cholera
would have to wait, being able to trace the origin of a disease was a huge leap forward in fighting
the spread of disease and also in disease prevention.
Major gains in the study of bacteriology furthered our scientific understanding of disease
and offered evidence that confirmed the germ theory. In 1882, after achieving fame as the first to
demonstrate the life cycle of the anthrax bacillus, Robert Koch discovered the tubercle bacillus,
the bacteria that causes tuberculosis.24 The following year, Koch would build on Snow’s earlier
work by using epidemiology to isolate the cholera bacillus. Koch’s discoveries legitimized germ
theory and led the scientific and medical communities to accept it as a theory that had been put to
the test and validated.25
Once germ theory had been proven, and epidemiology had successfully been used to
trace the origin of disease, the next step was the development of treatments. In 1890, Emil
Behring and Shibasaburo Kitasato proved that serum, the fluid remaining after all solids drawn
from the blood of an infected animal (tetanus in this case) had been removed, could be used to
protect against the disease. By 1891, this method had been used to not only prevent disease, but
also to successfully cure a patient suffering from diphtheria. Science now had the capability to
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not only protect against, but also cure disease.26 This was a major accomplishment for the
medical and scientific community and provided additional capabilities for the advancement of
public health. As 1918 grew near, there was a feeling of optimism that scientific discoveries
were on the verge of unlocking and mastering the mysteries of disease.

1918 Flu: From Kansas to Seattle
Camp Funston, a U.S. army training camp in Kansas, was the second largest cantonment
in the country, with an average population of 56,000 troops. On March 4, 1918, a private, one of
the cooks, reported to sick call with influenza. Over the next three weeks, more than 1,100
soldiers would report to the camp’s hospital with similar symptoms.27 Once the virus began to
spread at Camp Funston, it was only a matter of weeks before it had spread to at least a dozen
other military camps across the country.28 In April, thirty of the country’s fifty largest cities,
many of which were located near military bases, reported “excess mortality” from what was in
retrospect the “Spanish flu.”29 An unseasonably high number of influenza cases was reported in
Camp Lewis, near Seattle, Washington, in the summer of 1918, with 327 reported for the camp
on July 21.30 This first wave of the virus produced relatively mild symptoms and typically ran its
course within a local population within a matter of weeks after its arrival. Though many people
were infected with the disease during the spring of 1918, a lack of reporting both in the medical
26
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and public health communities, its relatively mild symptoms, and a lack of media attention
resulted in the vast majority of the population having no idea they were in the midst of an
epidemic.31
The influenza virus is believed to have traveled to Europe with American soldiers. The
1918 viral strain of influenza disproportionately affected young adults, aged fifteen to thirtyfour.32 In fact, people under forty-five years of age accounted for ninety-three percent of
influenza-related deaths during the fall and winter of 1918-1919. In a typical flu season, people
under forty-five make up twenty-five to thirty-four percent of influenza related deaths.33 This age
signature was particularly devastating for the young men that were fighting in the war. The virus
spread easily among soldiers given the war conditions in which large concentrations of young
men were crowded together in highly stressful situations.
As of May 1918, the presence of the virus in both the United States and Europe was
“prevalent;” however, because of the politics of war, there remained a lack of reporting. It was
not until the virus reached Spain that it was first reported on by the newspapers.34 Influenza was
widespread in Spain in May of 1918, and because Spain was not at war, it was one of the few
countries where the reporting of the disease was not censored in the newspapers. As a result, the
1918 flu became known as the “Spanish influenza.”35 Yet it was on the Western Front that the
31

Opdycke, 3-4.

32

Taubenberger and Morens, 19.

33

Lone Simonsen, Gerardo Chowell, Viggo Andreasen, Robert Gaffey, John Barry, Don Olson,
and Cécile Viboud, “A Review of the 1918 Herald Pandemic Wave: Importance for Contemporary
Pandemic Response Strategies,” Annals of Epidemiology 28, no. 5 (2018): 282, https://www-clinicalkeycom.offcampus.lib.washington.edu/#!/content/playContent/1-s2.0S1047279717307263?returnurl=null&referrer=null.
34

Opdycke, 4.

35

Simonsen, et al., 283.

16

virus is believed to have mutated into a more virulent strain before being transported back to the
United States, once again with the movement of soldiers.
The second wave of the 1918 influenza began on the East Coast when two or three sailors
arrived sick at Commonwealth Pier in Boston.36 Reports coming out of Boston and other east
coast cities served as a warning to the rest of the country and may have sufficiently scared those
on the West Coast into forming battle plans, so to speak, in preparation for the influenza’s
eventual arrival. Health officials on the East Coast had balked at the idea that the “Spanish flu,”
which had been devastating Europe, would reach the U.S. When it did arrive, they continued to
underestimate both the speed at which it would travel and its lethality, chalking it up to being just
another flu. Officials in Boston had likened the “Spanish flu” to a “bad cold.”37
In 1918, scientists as well as public health and government officials were not the only
ones trying to understand the “Spanish influenza;” everyone was trying to make sense of this
new disease. People wanted to know where the disease came from, and a convergence of fears
about the war and fears about contagion led to theories about its origin. Reports that German
soldiers were responsible for the contagion did not take long to surface. A headline from the
Seattle Star on September 19 reads, “Believe Huns From U-Boats Scattered Influenza in U.S.”
Lieutenant Colonel P.S. Doane, head of the health section of the shipping board, was quoted in
this article as saying, “[i]t is quite possible the epidemic was started by Huns sent ashore by
boche submarine commanders. We know that men have been sent ashore from German
submarines and it would be quite easy for these agents to turn loose the germs in theatres and
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other places where large numbers of people are assembled.”38 The article reports that just prior to
the outbreak, German submarine commanders carrying the disease were captured by U.S. navy
personnel. The author points out the intentionality of the Germans in that the Germans had
inoculated themselves against the disease and were spreading it as a form of warfare. The story
goes on to argue that the influenza was also first detected in Spain after the arrival of U-boats in
Spanish ports. This theory was repeated in newspaper articles during September and offered an
explanation as to why soldiers in army and navy camps, as well as those living in cities near
these camps, were the first to be stricken with the illness.39
A warning was sent out to the country by Surgeon General Rupert Blue on September 14,
1918, about the “grave” nature of the pandemic posed by the “Spanish flu.” He states that
“[p]eople are stricken on the streets, while at work in factories, shipyards, offices or elsewhere.
First there is a chill, then fever with temperature from 101 to 103, headache, backache, reddening
and running of the eyes, pains and aches all over the body and general prostration.”40 Under the
same headline, a report from Boston states that the influenza outbreak, which began there three
weeks prior, has resulted in a total of 1,693 cases and thirty-four deaths.41 The following day, a
Seattle Post-Intelligencer article reported 1,000 cases of influenza at Camp Devens,
Massachusetts.42 By September 26, there were reports of Boston being “panic stricken” by the
38

Believe Huns From U-Boats Scattered Influenza in U.S.,” Seattle Star, September 19, 1918, 1.

39

“Whole City on Guard Against Spread of Strange New Malady That Takes Huge Death Toll,”
Seattle Star, September 26, 1918, 8.
40

“Country Warned Spanish “Flu” is Grave Pandemic,” Seattle Post-Intelligencer, September 14,

41

Ibid.

42

“Influenza Spreading In War Cantonments,” Seattle Post-Intelligencer, September 15, 1918,

1918, 7.

13.

18

disease, which was “sweeping toward the west and south like a medieval plague...threaten[ing]
to overwhelm the whole country.”43
In addition to reports coming out of Boston and other east coast cities, the United States
Public Health Service provided information on the influenza in local newspapers. An article
titled “All About Spanish ‘Flu,’” was printed in the Seattle Star on September 26, 1918, and is
one example of national public health messaging and efforts to warn the public about the dangers
of influenza. This announcement detailed the symptoms of the flu, from its sudden onset, to
weakness and pains experienced, sore throats and, sometimes, bronchitis. High fevers were said
to usually fall within three to four days, followed by rapid recovery.44 The Public Health Service
(PHS) also reported that few deaths were occurring, but those that did were usually the result of
bronchitis, heart failure, or a combination of the two. The PHS listed sources of infection as
“secretions of the throat and nose passages, conveyed on handkerchiefs, towels, cups and
messgear or other methods.”45
The nature of the disease and the manner in which it spread remained somewhat of a
mystery, though germ theory by this time was the widely accepted theory for disease
transmission. Some medical personnel and leaders of public health, including the city of Seattle’s
Health Commissioner, Dr. J.S. McBride, argued that dirt and dust could also spread diseases,
including the flu. In an article appearing in the Seattle Star on September 21, 1918, McBride
states that Seattle had no reported cases of influenza, yet, and that a “fall of rain would make its
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presence impossible.”46 Over the following weeks, McBride continued to make the argument that
rain could stop the spread of influenza. In an October 5 article he elaborates on his point that the
rain would “aid in the fight against the spread of Spanish influenza” in Seattle since “the germs
are freely distributed in the dust in the streets.”47 This theory made it even more important for
people to abstain from spitting. The same article informed the public that the police had been
granted additional powers to combat the spread of influenza and that “persons spitting on
sidewalks or street cars are to be immediately placed under arrest.”48 Public health authorities
had been pushing anti-spitting education since the end of the nineteenth century as a way to stop
the spread of tuberculosis.49 New York was the first city to enact anti-spitting legislation in 1896,
with cities and towns across the United States following suit. By 1916, 195 of the 213 cities in
the United States with populations over 25,000 had enacted anti-spitting legislation.50 Absent a
definitive treatment or cure, public health officials set out on a massive campaign to educate the
public, both in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to combat tuberculosis and again
in 1918 to stop the spread of “Spanish flu” during the height of the influenza pandemic.
Public health and government officials implored everyone to do their part to stop the
spread of the influenza in 1918. In addition to anti-spitting legislation, Health Commissioner
McBride urged people to, “Keep away from people with colds; Eat plenty of nourishing food and
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keep your system in good shape with plenty of sleep and regular living; If you have any
symptoms of grip, go to a physician immediately.”51 These preventative measures and the
cooperation of the public were requested as acts of patriotism so as not to spread the disease,
especially to the shipyard workers whose health and labor was needed for the war effort.52
Health authorities in Seattle had the advantage of advanced warnings from east coast
cities as reports of the virus’ spread became increasingly concerning. By mid-September, there
was a general consensus among leaders in public health, nationally and in the greater Seattle
area, as to the serious dangers posed by this new strain of influenza as well as the important role
that public health would need to play in order to limit its spread. On September 26, an article
reported the number of infected soldiers at Camp Devens had risen to 6,000. There were at least
10,000 cases of influenza reported among civilians in Boston, and as many as one-hundred
people had died from the disease in one night alone.53 Near Seattle, on September 23, 173 cases
had been reported at Camp Lewis, mostly “among new draft men.”54 Then, on September 29, the
University of Washington’s naval training center reported 400 cases.55 The influenza pandemic
was spreading fast.
On October 5, 1918, the frontpage headline in the Seattle Post-Intelligencer reads,
“Seattle is Ready to Fight Spread of the Influenza.” This article announces the arrival of the
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influenza in Seattle, as Health Commissioner McBride confirms receiving reports of the first
case the previous day. State Commissioner of Health, T.D. Tuttle, states that the only way for
Seattle to escape the same fate as that of the east coast cities is to take “drastic steps.” The article
also states that there has been a ban issued against “all dances, public and private, [s]treet cars
and theaters were ordered [to be] well ventilated” and “all policemen were instructed to rigidly
enforce the anti-spitting ordinance.”56 The frontpage headline in the Seattle Star on October 5,
reads, “25 ‘Flu’ Cases Reported in Seattle.”57 A proclamation issued by Mayor Hanson, closing
“all churches, schools, theaters and places of assemblage,” is printed in this article.58
Seattle proactively enacted measures to limit the spread of influenza immediately
following the first reported cases of the disease in the city. Public health and government
officials’ knowledge and preparedness led to swift and decisive actions and a much more
aggressive approach to handling the virus than what had been seen on the East Coast. Seattle’s
death rate from the flu remained comparatively low as a result of these actions. There were a
total of 1,003 deaths in Seattle from influenza alone in the months of October, November and
December of 1918.59 Seattle’s excess death rate from influenza, from September 1918 to June
1919, was 4.9 percent per 1,000 people, whereas the city of Boston’s excess death rate for the
same time period was 8.7 percent per 1,000 people.60 These numbers show Seattle officials’
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success in limiting the toll influenza took on the city.
Seattle had a month to prepare, between the time the mutated influenza virus was first
identified in Boston and the first case was reported in Seattle. This gave public health and
government leaders time to recognize the serious threat the virus presented and time to prepare
for its arrival. Reports from east coast cities, as well as reports from the surgeon general and the
PHS served as a wake-up call for Seattle officials. As the virus made its way across the country,
arriving first in Camp Lewis and then the University of Washington’s naval training center, it
became clear that Seattle would not escape contact with the virus. Seattle’s mayor and health
commissioner recognized the serious threat influenza posed to those living in Seattle and worked
with other state and federal leaders to develop and implement plans which would limit the spread
of the disease. Their decisions to proactively ban dances, advocate for the proper ventilation of
gathering spaces, and enforce public health measures such as anti-spitting ordinances (and later
mask mandates) ultimately resulted in fewer influenza cases and in lower death rates in Seattle
than were seen in most of the country.

What We Know Now
In 1918, scientists and public health officials did not understand the viral nature of
influenza. The mysteries presented by the virus, including its origin, would not begin to be
solved until the 1930s when the H1N1 virus was isolated, first in pigs and then in humans.
Shortly after these discoveries, both viruses were linked to the 1918 influenza. The usual annual
circulation of flu is due to what is called viral antigenic drift, or a gradual mutation of the
influenza virus. In 1995, scientists set to work sequencing viral RNA fragments from archived
influenza autopsy materials that had been collected in the fall of 1918 in an effort to better
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understand the genomic structure and causes of the virus. A genomic sequence for the virus has
now been completed and scientists have concluded that the 1918 flu was a novel virus, meaning
that it had not been in circulation previously. After its appearance in 1918, the H1N1 viral strain
continued to circulate annually until a new H2N2 pandemic influenza (“Asian flu”) emerged in
1957. Interestingly, at that point, the H1N1 strain disappeared from human circulation until it
“‘reemerged’ from a laboratory freezer” in 1977.61 Scientists believe that “all 4 of the human and
swine H1N1 and H3N2 lineages” in circulation today are the descendants of the 1918 flu.62
Today, we know that birds such as geese and ducks are a natural reservoir species for the
flu virus; however, the flu virus is very rarely contracted by humans directly from birds. This is
due to the virus’ preferential binding sites, which differ between and are dependent on the
species they infect. Pigs and horses are two intermediate hosts; because of this, they are referred
to as “mixing vessels.” Intermediate hosts have receptors that are preferred by both avian and
human influenza viruses and host animals can contract the flu from both birds and humans. In
the case of the 1918 influenza, an intermediate host likely contracted the avian influenza virus
and then passed the virus on to humans. This is one of the reasons that flu epidemics tend to
originate in Southeast Asia, “where agricultural practices put ducks, swine and humans in close
contact.”63
We now know quite a bit about viruses; however, mysteries surrounding the exact origin
of the 1918 flu persist and continue to be debated by historians. The Chinese origin theory is one
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that has been debated by many. During the war, first the French and then the British made
arrangements with the Chinese government which provided indentured laborers from the
Chinese labor corps to assist in the war effort. These laborers most often worked behind the
lines. In 1917, 100,000 laborers embarked by ship from China and sailed across the Pacific
Ocean, arriving in Vancouver, Canada. From Vancouver, they traveled by train across Canada to
Halifax, and then continued their journey across the Atlantic to the Western Front by ship. It
was reported that many in the group were sick as they began their journey from China to North
America. China, at the time, was in the midst of what they were calling a pneumonic plague
outbreak. In a year's time, they would no longer be calling it the plague, but instead, the “Spanish
flu.”64
The Chinese origin theory remains mainly anecdotal. Another interesting, though
anecdotal theory, places the origin of the flu with the movement of North American horses to
Europe. Evolutionary biologist Michael Woroby explains that the British Remount Service
bought a large number of American horses for the war effort, contributing to “the largest
movement of horses that has ever occurred and will ever occur on the face of the planet.”65
Millions of horses were transported from North America to the Western Front between 1914 and
1916. Based on genetic analysis and reports detailing a large horse flu outbreak at the time,
Woroby believes that horses could have acted as intermediary hosts in transferring the virus
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between birds and humans.66 However, there are two other origin theories that are more widely
accepted by historians; the French origin theory and the American origin theory.
World-renowned virologist Professor John Oxford has been arguing for more than ten
years that the 1918 flu originated in Northern France at Etaples, Britain’s main military base
during the war. In addition to the military base, there was a hospital at this site which held up to
100,000 hospital beds. Oxford bases his theory, in part, on reports from 1916 which showed an
increase in the number of soldiers suffering from a mysterious bronchial, pneumonia-like illness.
Medical officer J.A.B Hammond and pathologist William Roland authored a 1917 article in the
Lancet describing autopsies they conducted during this time among soldiers who had died in
Northern France which noted a blue discoloration, or cyanosis of the face.67 The blue
discoloration of the skin would come to be a telltale sign of the “Spanish flu.” The autopsies also
revealed bulky lungs, the bronchi of which were filled with yellow pus, which was a clear
indication of infection. Damage to the lungs of this nature had only ever been seen in soldiers
who had been exposed to mustard gas, which indicates the severity of the damage caused by this
influenza. In addition to medical reports, Oxford argues that the overcrowded and stressful
conditions found on the military base, combined with its location along a bird migratory route,
offered the perfect set of conditions for the influenza pandemic to ignite. The H1N1 influenza
variant seen in the 1918 influenza outbreak comes from birds. Bird flus spread from migratory
birds, such as geese and ducks, to local geese and ducks, as well as domesticated chickens.
Oxford cites photographic evidence of soldiers in 1917 plucking geese for Christmas dinner.
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Additionally, the military base had a piggery, which is important since pigs act as intermediary
hosts in passing influenza from birds to humans.68
The American origin theory was first introduced by John Barry in his 2005 book The
Great Influenza. The earliest known report of the virus in the United States was at Camp
Funston, Kansas. Because influenza was not a reportable disease at the time, military records
offer one of the best and only sources for detailed reports to track the disease during the 1918
pandemic. With Camp Funston as a starting point, Barry used epidemiological evidence from
early 1918 to trace the influenza outbreak to a group of soldiers who had come into contact with
the virus while visiting nearby Haskell County, Kansas and brought it back with them when they
returned to Camp Funston.69 Interestingly, Haskell, like Etaples, also sits on a bird migration
route.70 Haskell was cattle country, where farmers also lived in close proximity to pigs and fowl.
Barry argues that this is where the first wave of the 1918 influenza began. Though the origin of
the “Spanish flu” continues to be debated, and may never be known conclusively, many
historians have accepted Barry’s conclusion that the virus’ origin was in Haskell County, Kansas
in February 1918.

Conclusion
With the arrival of COVID-19, it became clear that for many people the lessons of the
1918 flu had been lost to time. Perhaps one of the most important lessons learned during the
1918 pandemic is the importance of preparedness and of continued funding for emergent disease
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surveillance, monitoring and appropriate countermeasures. In his 2018 article “Better Prepare
than React: Reordering Public Health Priorities 100 Years After the Spanish Influenza,” Michael
Greenberger argues that despite advances in technology and pharmaceuticals, decreased public
health funding has left the United States, and the world, vulnerable to emerging viruses. He
states that thirty-one states cut funding for local health departments between fiscal year 20152016 and fiscal year 2016-2017.71 Additionally, at the time that Greenberger’s article was
written, Congress and the Trump administration had cut $1.35 billion from the Prevention and
Public Health fund for the following 10-year period. This funding cut was projected to affect the
CDC’s ability to carry out public health efforts; it is particularly troublesome to note that these
cuts included public health efforts in China. At the time, public health organizations cautioned
that “critical momentum will be lost if epidemic prevention funding is reduced, leaving the world
unprepared for the next outbreak.”72 The defunding of public health immediately prior to the
emergence of the novel coronavirus could not have come at a worse time.
Another lesson from the 1918 flu that seems to have been forgotten is the importance of
accurate and consistent public health messaging and education. Information on public health
since the emergence of COVID-19 has been disjointed and contradictory among leaders in
government. Former President Trump publicly dismissed the novel coronavirus as a “hoax” and
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compared it to the seasonal “flu.”73 This statement echoes those made by officials in cities like
Boston at the beginning of the second wave of “Spanish influenza.” Both then and now, the
comparison of a pandemic-causing virus with a virus that is perceived by many as familiar and
less threatening adds to what Tom Dicke terms “cognitive inertia;” this is the inability or
unwillingness to accept a new reality. Politicians who contradict scientists and public health
officials add to the public’s confusion about how to respond to a viral threat and foster an
environment in which a lack of knowledge leads to higher transmission rates and deaths from
emerging viruses.
Politicians are not alone in having contributed to contradictory public messaging. In
1918, Rupert Blue, the United States surgeon general, warned the public of the “grave” danger
posed by the “Spanish influenza” and offered advice as to how to limit disease transmission. In
contrast, at the beginning of the COVID-19 outbreak, Surgeon General Jerome M. Adams,
demanded Americans “STOP BUYING FACE MASKS!... [t]hey are NOT effective in
preventing general public from catching #Coronavirus,” in a tweet from February 29, 2020.74
While this statement was made in the context of a shortage of masks for health care workers, the
repercussions were long lasting, leading many Americans to believe that masks are indeed
ineffective for stopping the spread of the coronavirus. Non-pharmaceutical interventions, like
practicing social distancing and wearing masks, are the most effective ways to limit viral
transmission in the absence of vaccines. The public relies on consistent messaging in order to
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make sense of national disasters such as pandemics, and this has not occurred with COVID-19
messaging.
In 1918, preparation, cooperation between leaders at the federal and state level, unified
and consistent public health messaging, and the implementation of proactive preventative
measures led to Seattle’s successes in limiting the spread of influenza and resulted in Seattle
having one of the lowest death rates from the disease in the country. The actions of Seattle public
health and government officials can serve as an example for leaders today. The lessons learned
from Seattle’s handling of the 1918 influenza can be applied today in our efforts to combat
diseases like COVID-19 and novel viral strains that may arise in the future.
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